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ABSTRACT
Many studies argue that adding more money to schools has little effect on student
achievement. However, there is a growing belief that the allocation of the funds in school
districts matters. To test the importance of allocating extra funds to specific spending
categories, I use a fractional logit model to estimate the proportions of students who pass the
English and Mathematics MCAS exams in Massachusetts school districts. I first use a one-year
lag of total in-district expenditures per-pupil as the variable of interest, then I break down the
total into lagged teacher and non-teacher expenditures per-pupil. The results of my estimations
show no evidence of an effect of total in-district expenditures per-pupil on the passing rate for
the English and Mathematics MCAS exams. However, there is a positive and significant effect of
teacher expenditures per-pupil on the passing rate of the 10th grade Mathematics MCAS exam. I
also use a multinomial fractional logit model to compare three outcomes (passing, needing
improvement, and failing) rather than just two and find similar results. By understanding how
each expenditure category affects student test scores, school district administrators can
increase the benefits from their budgetary allocations.
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1. INTRODUCTION
From 1974 to 2014, the total expenditures per-pupil on primary and secondary public
education in the United States grew from $6,356 to $12,509 in real dollars, a 97% increase in the
budget in 40 years (National Center for Education Statistics). However, the addition of funds in
the education sector has not produced much gain in student achievement, specifically student
test scores. From 2003 to 2015, the average standardized score of U.S. 15-year-olds on the
Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) reading literacy scale and the mathematics
literacy scale sunk by 3.2 and 2.9 point respectively (National Center for Education Statistics).
The lack of a clear effectiveness of money spent on public schooling on student outcomes may
be why the United States has been cutting back on education funding in recent years (OECD,
2017). But just considering how total funds affect test scores is too broad. Determining how the
money is spent on specific resources in a school district provides a deeper understanding of the
way school finance influences student outcomes like test scores.
A district’s total funds for its public education are spent on teachers’ salaries,
maintenance of the schools, transportation services, textbooks, etc. Certain categories of
expenditure may affect student achievement more than others. When only considering the
aggregate of all expenditure categories, the effects of these significant categories of expenditure
will not shine through, leading to the belief that money does not matter. Or, in findings where
total expenditures are significant, the result could be driven by only a few significant
expenditure categories. In either case, adding extra funds to school districts does not ensure
that this money makes a significant impact on student outcomes. According to Hanushek, “local
districts do not use funds effectively, which complicates just throwing money at the schools”
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(Hanushek, 1997). Studying how each expenditure category affects test scores may lead to
insights on maximizing student achievement subject to the district funding budget constraint.
My research focuses on estimating the effect of expenditures per-pupil on the proportions of
students who pass, need improvement, or fail the 10th grade Massachusetts Comprehensive
Assessment System (MCAS) exams for English and for Mathematics in a school district.
There are four test outcomes students can earn on the 10th grade MCAS exams:
advanced, proficient, needs improvement, and fail. Each of these outcomes results in different
consequences according to the Massachusetts Department of Education. Both advanced and
proficient scores are considered passing and satisfy the state’s competency determination
requirement for graduating high school. The difference between these two outcomes is that an
advanced score makes a student eligible for state-funded college scholarships. Therefore, in my
research, I combine advanced and proficient into a passing category. If a student received a
needs improvement score on a 10th grade MCAS exam, they must fulfill the requirements of an
Educational Proficiency Plan. These plans include the school district reviewing a student’s
strengths and weaknesses in the specific subject area, the student completing extra courses in
the subject area, the school administering a retake of the MCAS test and the student showing
progress toward proficiency in the grade 10 standards of that subject. Once these requirements
are met, the student is deemed competent and allowed to graduate high school. A student who
fails an MCAS exam is unable to graduate high school. The student must fulfill the requirements
of the Educational Proficiency Plan but cannot be deemed competent in the grade 10 curriculum
standards until his/her score is in the needs improvement zone. The difference between needs
improvement and fail is the value of improvement for the goal of earning a high school diploma.

2

If a student with a needs improvement score gets a slightly better score on next year’s exam but
still receives needs improvement, he/she passes the state’s competency determination
requirement for graduating. A student who fails the MCAS test and earns a few points higher
the next year while staying in the failing range is unable to graduate. With different
consequences attached to each MCAS score outcome, it’s important to consider each category
when looking at the effect of school district expenditures on test scores.
The first model I use is a fractional logit model. I estimate the effect of school district
expenditures on the log odds of the proportion passing versus not passing the MCAS exams in a
district. The second model I use is a multinomial fractional logit model to break down the score
options further into the proportions of students in a district passing, needing improvement, and
failing the MCAS exams. In the fractional multinomial logit model, I estimate the effect of school
district expenditures on the log odds of a district’s students passing relative to needing
improvement on the MCAS exams and the log odds of a district’s students failing relative to
needing improvement on the MCAS exams. I use variations of these two models to estimate the
effect of expenditures on MCAS test outcomes. I first use a one-year lag of total in-district
expenditures per-pupil as the variable of interest, then I break down the total into lagged
teacher and non-teacher expenditures per-pupil. I use teacher expenditures because teachers
have a direct impact on student learning. Also, there is evidence of a relationship between
teacher wages and teacher quality (Loeb and Page, 2000). I lag the expenditure variables
because the budget is determined for the next school year before the MCAS test is taken. For
example, the budget for the 2015-2016 school year is determined at the end of the 2014-2015
school year. Therefore, the scores on the 2016 MCAS exam are matched with school budget
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expenditures determined in 2015 that were allocated in the 2015-2016 school year. The model
also includes control variables like teacher retention rate and the number of students in the
district. These are variables that are correlated with student test scores that would bias the
estimates if not included.
The biggest problem with my research is the omitted variable bias. There are
unobserved variables, such as teacher experience and parental involvement, in the error term of
my models that are correlated with student test scores and possibly school district expenditures
as well. The omitted variable bias creates biased coefficient estimates. To remedy this problem,
I add district fixed effects to the model to pick up any district-specific effects that are correlated
with the school expenditures. Although the omitted variable bias might remain with this
approach, the coefficients are less biased when using the district fixed effects.
From my research, I find that allocating extra funds towards teachers’ salaries increases
the proportion of students in the district who pass the Mathematics MCAS exam the following
year. My research also reveals that the students most likely affected by additional funds in the
budget are those who need improvement. These middle-ground students are easier to push into
the passing score range, but also are more likely to fall into the failing score range. I find that
adding funds to teacher expenditures will push needs improvement students up to a passing
score on the 10th grade Mathematic MCAS exam. I also find that additional funds towards nonteacher expenditures will cause scores of students who need improvement to decrease to a
failing score on the 10th grade Mathematics exam. However, before pouring too much money
towards teachers, one must consider the disaggregated categories of non-teacher expenditures.
Future research could delve further into this.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The education production function is the basis of my research. A production function
describes the maximum level of output possible from combinations of inputs. In an education
setting, examples of output are students’ test scores or high school drop-out rates. Examples of
inputs are class size and number of hours in the school day. The input variables can be
separated into two types: school input variables and student input variables (Lamdin, 1996).
School input variables, like student-teacher ratio and expenditure per-pupil, are easier to
change than student input variables, like socioeconomic status and innate student ability. School
input variables are subject to direct changes from educational policies. Policymakers focus on
school inputs for this reason, but research provides mixed results on the relationship between
these inputs and education outputs. Out of estimates from 377 separate production-functions,
71% exhibited no correlation between teacher experience and student performance (Hanushek,
2010). Education production functions do not have a clear list of inputs consistently used
because of this uncertainty of the relationship between the inputs and output.
One problem that occurs with the estimation of the education production function is
omitted variable bias. It’s difficult to include all necessary input variables that affect student
achievement because they might not be available with the given data or they may not be
measurable. Goldhaber and Brewer ameliorated omitted variable bias in their study by using
value-added production functions to control for previous knowledge or ability (Goldhaber and
Brewer, 1997). Stanca estimated the effect of lecture attendance on test scores in an
introductory microeconomics course using fixed and random effects in the education production
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function (Stanca, 2006). While these approaches eliminate some bias in the coefficients, there
may still be omitted variable bias in the estimations.
The topic of the effectiveness of school spending has been widely covered in the past
and is still debated today. Debate on the topic began in 1966 with the release of the report
“Equality of Educational Opportunity,” in which Coleman presented evidence that school
funding does not have a significant effect on student’s test scores (Coleman, 1966). Twenty
years later, Hanushek compiled data from the educational production function from 38 different
articles and books and 187 equations to gain insights on whether money matters in schools. He
found only 20% of the estimates showed a positive and statistically significant relationship
between per-pupil expenditure and student outcome (Hanushek, 1986). In response to
Hanushek’s article, researchers reanalyzed Hanushek’s sample using a stronger statistical
method and found evidence of a positive effect of school resources on student achievement
(Hedges, Lane, and Greenwald, 1994).
Clashing evidence has fueled research regarding the importance of money in public
education. While some researchers show the amount of money in a school budget does not
affect student achievement (Hanushek, 1986; Okpala, Okpala, and Smith, 2001), other
researchers provide evidence that expenditures plays a significant role in student test scores
and other long-run outcomes (Lafortune, Rothstein, and Schanzenbach, 2018; Jackson, Johnson,
and Persico, 2016; Ram, 2004; Payne and Biddle, 1999). With varying methodologies and models
producing mixed results, no consensus has been reached on the effect of school funding on
student achievement.

6

Researchers have gone beyond aggregated expenditure data to consider specific
categories of school resource expenditures. The categories researchers have focused on include
teacher salaries, administrative services and books and technology. There exists mixed evidence
on the effect of fund allocation on student achievement. Some studies find positive effects of
increasing expenditures in certain categories, specifically categories directly tracked to the
classrooms like instructional support materials (Archibald, 2006; Elliot, 1998). Cobb-Clark and
Nikhil’s study on the allocation of school resources in Australia found evidence that spending on
experienced teachers is linked to writing achievement at the elementary school level (CobbClark and Nikhil, 2016). Increased spending on learning and teaching support materials is
strongly associated with lower Grade 1 and Grade 7 repetition rates in two provinces in South
Africa (Boateng, 2014). Okpala, Okpala, and Smith, however, use a sample of schools from a lowincome county in North Carolina find that expenditures on instructional supplies were not
significant in explaining mathematics test scores (Okpala, Okpala, and Smith, 2001).
Increases in teacher salaries might result in increased teacher quality, which may
influence student achievement. Some research has been done into the effect of teacher wages
on student test scores. Currall et al. studied the relationship between pay satisfaction and
organizational outcomes using survey results from 6,394 public school teachers. They found that
pay satisfaction was positively correlated to school district-level academic performance (Currall
et al., 2005). Loeb and Page provide evidence that raising teachers’ wages by 10% would reduce
high school dropout rates by between 3% and 6% (Loeb and Page, 2000). Many studies also
show a connection between high quality teaching and improved test scores, higher future
wages, and greater education attainment (Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander, 2007; Chetty et al.,
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2011; Archibald, 2006; Darling-Hammond, 2000). Teachers’ salaries and teacher quality could
have a positive impact on student achievement.
Although this topic has been covered by many researchers in the past, no clear
consensus on the effect of school funds and resources on student test scores means there is still
more to learn. My research differs from past studies in a few ways. First off, I use data from
2012 to 2017, which is more recent than other studies. Second, I focus on a wider geographical
region than most studies. I include districts from the whole state of Massachusetts, rather than
just from a certain region. Lastly, I model three outcomes on the MCAS exam instead of just
passing and not passing. This allows me to consider improvements– from failing to needing
improvement and needing improvement to passing– that would not be detected in a twooutcome model.

Public-School Finance in Massachusetts
Education funding in Massachusetts relies on local revenue, state revenue, and federal
revenue. Compared to other states, Massachusetts more heavily relies on local sources, like
property taxes, to fund its public education. In fact, in 2010, the state ranked seventh most
dependent on local dollars and fourth least dependent on federal dollars to fund education
(Gustafson, 2012). Because Massachusetts is a relatively wealthy state and federal funding
targets low-income districts, education is funded mainly by local and state revenue.
The Chapter 70 program establishes the amount of state aid a district receives in
Massachusetts. The formula considers how much the local government can raise through
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property taxes to fund education in its district and how much the state would need to
contribute to ensure that a district has sufficient resources to provide education to all its
students. The program strives to equalize expenditures per-pupil by transferring more aid to
low-income districts and less aid to wealthy districts.
According to the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education,
Chapter 70 aid is determined by the following simplified steps. The first is a calculation of the
minimum spending requirements of a school district known as the foundation budget. The
second step is calculating the required local contribution or how much local tax revenue a
district can raise and allocate to education spending. Chapter 70 fills the gap between the local
contribution of the district and its foundation budget. Districts may contribute more than the
required local contribution, which creates inequality in total funding across the state. Wealthy
districts have the capital to allocate more funds towards education, while some poor districts
are unable to meet the required local contribution set by the state. Even with the gap in total
school expenditures between districts, Massachusetts spends more in terms of per-pupil
expenditures than the national average. In 2010, the cost-adjusted per-pupil expenditure in
Massachusetts was $13,454 while the national average that year was $10,847, roughly a $3,000
difference (Gustafson, 2012). Once the total expenditure per-pupil budget is finalized for each
district, the administration of the district decides how to allocate the funds to categories of
expenditures like teacher salaries.
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3. DATA DESCRIPTION
In this study, I use data from the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and
Secondary Education. The website provides information on all districts and schools within the
state. I collected data on districts that provide levels of education from kindergarten through
high school. From this specification, I include 225 school districts in my dataset. For each district,
I collected the proportion of students who passed, needed improvement, and failed on both the
10th grade English MCAS exam and the 10th grade Mathematics MCAS exam. The proportion of
10th grade students in a district who pass an exam is the sum of the proportions of students
whose score is either advanced or proficient on an exam. I compiled the assessment result data
for the years 2013 through 2017.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of MCAS Test Results
Variables
Proportion who pass the
English MCAS exam
Proportion who need
improvement on the
English MCAS exam
Proportion who fail the
English MCAS exam
Proportion who pass the
Mathematics MCAS
exam
Proportion who need
improvement on the
Mathematics MCAS
exam
Proportion who fail the
Mathematics MCAS
exam

Mean (standard
deviation)
0.9262
(.0618)
0.0505
(.0445)

Minimum

Maximum

0.62

1

0

0.26

0.0232
(.0221)

0

0.18

0.8190
(.1160)

0.35

1

0.1197
(.0704)

0

0.35

0.0613
(.0549)

0

0.38
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The descriptive statistics of the MCAS test results in Table 3.1 show the differences
between districts. The average proportion of 10th grade students who pass the English MCAS
exam is about 10 percentage points higher than the average proportion who pass the
Mathematics MCAS exam. Also, the minimum pass rate on the English exam is double the
minimum pass rate on the Mathematics exam. The proportions of results on the Mathematics
MCAS exam have more variation than on the English MCAS exam. Because results are more
spread out on the Math MCAS exam, the expenditure variables may have a larger effect on
these outcomes than on the outcomes of the English MCAS exam.
I obtain the school finance data in years 2012 to 2017 from the Massachusetts
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education website as well. School finance data is only
available at the district level. The dataset includes the total in-district expenditures and ten
categories of in-district expenditures: administration, instructional leadership, teachers, other
teaching services, professional development, instructional materials/equipment/technology,
guidance/counseling/testing, pupil services, operations and maintenance, and benefits and fixed
charges. Table A.1 in the appendix describes the types of expenditures fit into each of the ten
categories. All expenditures used in my dataset are given as per full-time enrolled pupil, rather
than a total amount spent on each category for the year. In my model, I use total in-district
expenditures per-pupil and the breakdown of total in-district expenditures into teacher
expenditures per-pupil and non-teacher expenditures per-pupil. The teacher expenditures perpupil category includes spending on classroom teachers and specialist teachers like art or gym.
Although the total in-district expenditure data included in my dataset is for 2012 to 2017, the
breakdown of expenditures is only recorded for 2013 to 2017.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of Expenditures and District Control Variables
Variable
Total In-district
Expenditures PerPupil
Teacher Expenditures
Per-Pupil
Median Household
Income
Urban
Suburban
Rural
Proportion of White
Students
Proportion of AfricanAmerican Students
Proportion of
Hispanic Students
Proportion of Asian
Students
Proportion of Other
Students
Student-Teacher
Ratio
Teacher Retention
Rate
% Students
Chronically Absent
Number of Students

Mean (standard
deviation)
$14,020.03
(2531.29)

Minimum

Maximum

$9,351.93

$29,621.61

$5,532.56
(892.97)
$81,770.92
(27,162.01)
0.244
(0.430)
0.659
(0.474)
0.097
(.296)
0.784
(0.189)
0.042
(0.067)
0.095
(0.138)
0.047
(0.0600)
0.032
(0.0180)
13.46
(1.596)
0.881
(0.056)
0.108
(.052)
3,771.4
(4,791.36)

$3,747.96

$10,902.67

$31,628

$201,200

0

1

0

1

0

1

.045

.991

.001

.57

0

.922

0

.379

.001

.122

8.4

21

.36

.984

.016

.318

414.1

56,858.8

Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics of expenditure as well as the district control
variables. There is a wide range of total in-district expenditures per pupil, from a minimum of
just under $10,000 per-pupil to a maximum of just under $30,000 per-pupil. However, 97% of
the observation fall between $10,000 per-pupil and $20,000 per-pupil. Although the Chapter 70
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program is in place to ensure equity, there is still a big gap between the lowest per-pupil
expenditure and the highest. The amount of per-pupil expenditures spent on teachers also
varies quite a bit, from a minimum of $3,747 per-pupil to a maximum of $10,900 per-pupil. The
average teacher expenditure per-pupil accounts for almost 40% of the average total
expenditures per-pupil. The large amount of per-pupil expenditure spent solely on teacher
salaries indicates the value that school districts place on teachers.
I use control variables in my model to account for any differences between districts that
change over time and would not be picked up by the district fixed effects. I collected data for
the median household income, location, total number of pupils, racial composition of the
students, student-teacher ratio, teacher retention rate, and percent of students chronically
absent (absent for over 10% of school days) for each school district. Data on median household
income for each year in each district came from the U.S. Census Bureau 2012-2016 American
Community Survey 5-Year Estimates. Because the median household income will be released in
September, I obtain data between 2012 and 2016. To avoid losing observations, I use a 1-year
lag for median household income in the model. It’s appropriate to use a 1-year lag for median
income because it takes time for changes in income to trickle down and affect a student’s
education. The change is not immediate. For regional school districts, I use a weighted average
of the median household income calculated using the median household income of each town
in the district and weighting based on the total population of the town. In most of the regional
school districts, the towns within the district had similar median household incomes. From Table
3.2, the median household incomes of districts in my dataset range from $31,628 to $201,200, a
difference of around $170,000.
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The location of the district is categorized as either urban, suburban, or rural. I use a
classification system released by the Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC), a government
regional planning agency in Massachusetts, to decide which location category each district
would fit into. MAPC identified five basic community types across the state: Inner Core, Regional
Urban Centers, Maturing Suburbs, Developing Suburbs, and Rural Towns. I aggregated Inner
Core and Regional Urban Centers to create my urban location category. I aggregated Maturing
Suburbs and Developing Suburbs to create my suburban location category. The Rural Towns
community type makes up my rural location category. In my dataset, 24.4% of the districts are
urban, 65.9% are urban, and 9.7% are rural. Because the location type of the district is constant
through the years for each district, the location variable is not included for the estimations with
district fixed effects to avoid perfect multicollinearity.
The other control variables are provided by the Massachusetts Department of
Elementary and Secondary Education for each district. I include the total number of pupils in the
district, the racial composition of students in the school district, student-teacher ratio, teacher
retention rate, and percent of students considered chronically absent. Student-teacher ratio is
used as an indicator of class size. Although they are not equal because not all teachers counted
in the student-teacher ratio are directly teaching students, one expects that a higher studentteacher ratio is related to larger class sizes. Multiple studies have found that smaller class sizes
improve students’ test scores (Schanzenbach, 2010; Chetty et al., 2011; Jepsen and Rivkin,
2009). There is evidence that teacher retention rate has a significant effect on achievement as
well. Ronfeldt, Loeb, and Wyckoff show that high teacher turnover results in lower test scores in
both English and Math and the effect is especially strong in schools with high proportions of
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low-performing students (Ronfeldt, Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2012). Lastly, I include the percent of
students considered chronically absent. These students have been absent from school 10% of
the whole school year. Since the mandatory length of a school year is 180 days and there are
approximately 21 school days in a month, this is the equivalent of missing approximately a
month of school. Adding this variable in the model will control for the chronically absent
students who receive poor test scores because they were not in school and did not learn
anything. High levels of chronic absenteeism could also affect the learning environment for
regularly-attending students and slow the pace of learning to try to catch-up the frequently
absent students.
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4. MODEL
Fractional Logit Model
I use a fractional logit model to estimate the effect of expenditures on the proportion of
10th grade students in the district who pass the English MCAS exam and Mathematics MCAS
exam. The baseline is the proportion of 10th grade students in the district who do not pass the
exam. The “not passing” rate is the consolidation of the needs improvement and failing rates.

𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 =

𝑒 𝛼𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 +𝛽𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑋+𝛿𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝐶+𝜌𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝐷+𝜀𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠
1 + 𝑒 𝛼𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 +𝛽𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑋+𝛿𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝐶+𝜌𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝐷+𝜀𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠

𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠
= 𝑒 𝛼𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 +𝛽𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑋+𝛿𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝐶+𝜌𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝐷+𝜀𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠
1 − 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑷𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔
𝐥𝐧 [
] = 𝜶𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔 + 𝜷𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔 𝑿 + 𝜹𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔 𝑪 + 𝝆𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔 𝑫 + 𝜺𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔
𝟏 − 𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑷𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔

In the equations above, PROPpass is the proportion of 10th grade students in a district
who pass the English or Mathematics MCAS exam, X is the vector of one-year lagged categories
of expenditures (total in-district expenditures, teacher expenditures, non-teacher expenditures),
C is the vector of control variables, and D is a vector of district dummy variables for the district
fixed effects. The control variables are median household income, location dummies, total
number of students, racial composition of the students, student-teacher ratio, teacher retention
rate, and percent of student chronically absent. The coefficient of interest is βpass: the
coefficients for the expenditure variables. If any of these coefficients is significant, it means that
allocating extra money to that expenditure category is significant in changing the log-odds of
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proportion of 10th grade students who pass versus the proportion of 10th grade students who do
not pass the English or Mathematics MCAS exam.

Multinomial Fractional Logit Model
I use a multinomial fractional logit model to estimate the effect of expenditures on the
log-odds of passing and failing on the English and Mathematics MCAS exams, using needing
improvement as the baseline category. The three proportions I use are 1.) PROPpass, or the
proportion of students who pass the 10th grade English (Mathematics) MCAS exam 2.) PROPni, or
the proportion of students who need improvement on the 10th grade English (Mathematics)
MCAS exam and 3.) PROPfail, or the proportion of students who fail the 10th grade English
(Mathematics) MCAS exam. By modeling with a multinomial logit, I allow for multiple outcomes
on the MCAS exams, instead of passing and not passing. Rather than additional expenditures
bumping up the passing rate by lowering the non-passing rate, additional expenditures could be
shifting up the proportion of students with needs improvement score by decreasing the number
of students with a failing score. Although these students with a needs improvement score would
not be passing, the extra money still produces better scores on the exam. The fractional logit
model using proportion of student who pass the English or Mathematics MCAS exam does not
account for this improvement within the non-passing score category. Questions regarding
movement in the proportions of students needing improvement and failing these exams when
additional funds are distributed to a district can be answered using the multinomial fractional
logit model. The details on the formation of a model that can be estimated are below. The
equations I estimate are (4.1) and (4.2).
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𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 =
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑛𝑖 =

𝑒 𝛼1 +𝛽1 𝑋+𝛿1 𝐶+𝜌1 𝐷+𝜀𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝑒 𝛼1 +𝛽1 𝑋+𝛿1 𝐶+𝜌1 𝐷+𝜀1 + 𝑒 𝛼2 +𝛽2 𝑋+𝛿2 𝐶+𝜌2 𝐷+𝜀2 + 1

𝑒 𝛼1 +𝛽1 𝑋+𝛿1 𝐶+𝜌1 𝐷+𝜀1

𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 =

1
+ 𝑒 𝛼2 +𝛽2 𝑋+𝛿2 𝐶+𝜌2 𝐷+𝜀2 + 1

𝑒 𝛼2 +𝛽2 𝑋+𝛿1 𝐶+𝜌1 𝐷+𝜀2
𝑒 𝛼1 +𝛽1 𝑋+𝛿1 𝐶+𝜌1 𝐷+𝜀1 + 𝑒 𝛼2 +𝛽2 𝑋+𝛿2 𝐶+𝜌2 𝐷+𝜀2 + 1

𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠
= 𝑒 𝛼1 +𝛽1 𝑋+𝛿1 𝐶+𝜌1 𝐷+𝜀1
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑛𝑖
𝒍𝒏 [

𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑷𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔
] = 𝜶𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑿 + 𝜹𝟏 𝑪 + 𝝆𝟏 𝑫 + 𝜺𝟏
𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑷𝒏𝒊

(𝟒. 𝟏)

𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙
= 𝑒 𝛼2 +𝛽2 𝑋+𝛿2 𝐶+𝜌2 𝐷+𝜀2
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑛𝑖
𝒍𝒏 [

𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑷𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒍
] = 𝜶𝟐 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑿 + 𝜹𝟐 𝑪 + 𝝆𝟐 𝑫 + 𝜺𝟐
𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑷𝒏𝒊

(𝟒. 𝟐)

As in the previous model, X is the vector of 1-year lagged expenditure categories (total
in-district expenditures, teacher expenditures, non-teacher expenditures), C is the vector of
control variables, and D is a vector of district dummy variables. The coefficients of interest are
β1 and β2 the coefficients for the expenditure variables. β1 represents how a monetary change in
expenditures affects the log odds of a district’s students passing the exam versus needing
improvement on the exam. β2 represents how a monetary change in expenditures affects the
log odds of a district’s students failing the exam versus needing improvement on the exam.
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5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Fractional Logit Model
The first model I estimate is the fractional logit model with the one-year lagged total indistrict expenditures per-pupil as the variable of interest. I use the fracreg logit command in
Stata to fit a logit distribution for the proportion of students in a district who pass the MCAS
exams because my dependent variable contains values between 0 and 1. The results of the
analysis are in Table 5.1 for both the proportion of 10th grade students in the district who pass
the English MCAS exam and the proportion of 10th grade students in the district who pass the
Mathematics MCAS exam as response variables.
From the preferred estimation with district fixed effects, there is no evidence that the
one-year lag of total in-district expenditures per-pupil has a significant effect on the log odds of
the proportion of 10th grade students in a district that pass the English MCAS exam or the
Mathematics MCAS exam. The p-values for the lagged total in-district expenditure coefficients
are well above any relevant alpha level for both model estimations. Compared to the model
estimations performed without the district effects, the coefficients on expenditures became
insignificant, lower, and even switched signs when district dummies were included. The drastic
change when adding the district fixed effects shows that omitted variable bias created
unreliable coefficients. The unobserved variables captured with the district dummy variables
have a greater effect on the log odds of a district’s students passing relative to not passing the
MCAS exams than the lagged total in-district expenditures in the district.
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Table 5.1: Fractional Logit Model with Total In-District Expenditures as the Variable of
Interest

Lagged total
in-district
expenditure
(in thousands
of dollars
per-pupil)
Lagged
income (in
thousands of
dollars)
Urban
Rural
Proportion of
African
American
Students
Proportion of
Hispanic
Student
Proportion of
Asian
Students
Proportion of
Other Race
Students
StudentTeacher Ratio
Teacher
Retention
Chronic
Absence
Number of
Students (in
thousands)
Constant
District fixed
effects?
Number of
observations

Dependent: pass_eng
Coeff.
P>|z| Coeff.
(Std. Err.)
(Std. Err.)
.0161*
0.095
.0042
(.0096)
(.0190)

P>|z|
0.823

Dependent: pass_math
Coeff.
P>|z| Coeff.
(Std. Err.)
(Std. Err.)
.0310*** 0.000
-.0120
(.0085)
(.0148)

P>|z|
0.415

.0149***
(.0011)

0.000

-.0034
(.0025)

0.172

.0137***
(.0009)

0.000

.0021
(.002)

0.289

-.0806*
(.0425)
.238***
(.0665)
-1.087***
(.2034)

0.058

-

-

0.131

-

-

0.000

-

-

0.003

-

-

0.000

1.045
(1.954)

0.593

-.0538
(.0356)
.1470***
(.0489)
-1.05***
(.2027)

0.000

-.3707
(1.761)

0.833

-1.134***
(.1173)

0.000

-.4803
(.7890)

0.543

-1.106***
(.1243)

0.000

-.6578
(1.015)

0.517

.1518
(.2463)

0.538

1.840
(1.679)

0.273

1.465***
(.299)

0.000

0.6967
(1.296)

0.591

-2.006**
(.9445)

0.034

-.2106
(2.349)

0.929

-1.324*
(.7790)

0.089

-2.880
(2.169)

0.184

-.0318**
(.0133)
.6579***
(.2324)
-2.926***
(.481)
.0042**
(.0020)

0.017

.0195
(.0182)
.1151
(.2378)
.2356
(.7547)
-.1065**
(.050)

0.284

-.0166
(.0112)
1.142***
(.2348)
-3.297***
(.425)
.0081***
(.0021)

0.138

.0113
(.0151)
.5803**
(.2363)
-.7270
(.5589)
-.053
(.0403)

0.453

1.647***
(.3513)
NO

0.000

2.531***
(.5171)
YES

0.000

-.2097
(.3255)
NO

0.519

1.109***
(.4876)
YES

0.023

1,125

0.006
0.000
0.041

0.628
0.755
0.033

1,125

1,125
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0.000
0.000
0.000

1,125

0.014
0.193
0.189

Wald chi2
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2

2839.53
0.00000
0.0655

52305.52
0.00000
0.0808

3146.43
0.00000
0.0711

36941.5
0.00000
0.0854

*=significant at α=0.10; **=significant at α=0.05; ***=significant at α=0.01
Although there is no significance of the one-year lag of total in-district expenditures perpupil on the passing rates on the English and Math MCAS exams, there could be one or more
significant expenditure category that is hidden by the insignificance of other expenditure
categories when the expenditures are aggregated into a total. For this reason, I estimate the
fractional logit model with one-year lagged teacher expenditures per-pupil and one-year lagged
non-teacher expenditures per-pupil as the variables of interest. The results of this analysis are
found in Table 5.2 for both the proportion of 10th grade students in the district who pass the
English MCAS exam and the proportion of 10th grade students in the district who pass the
Mathematics MCAS exam as response variables.
The results of the model including district fixed effects with one-year lagged total indistrict expenditures split into teacher expenditures and non-teacher expenditures shows that
one-year lagged teacher expenditures shows a significant and positive effect only on the
proportion of 10th grade students who pass the Mathematics MCAS exam. The effect of the oneyear lagged teacher expenditures is insignificant on the proportion of 10th grades students who
pass the English MCAS exam. Also, the one-year lagged non-teacher expenditures is significant
(and negative) in the estimation for the Mathematics MCAS exam but not for the estimation
with the English MCAS exam. This suggest expenditures affect learning and the ability to pass
the exams in these two subjects differently.
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Table 5.2: Fractional Logit Model with Teacher and Non-Teacher Expenditures as the
Variables of Interest

Lagged teacher
expenditures (in
thousands perpupil)
Lagged nonteacher
expenditures (in
thousands perpupil)
Urban
Rural
Lagged income (in
thousands of
dollars)
Proportion of
African-American
Students
Proportion of
Hispanic Students
Proportion of
Asian Students
Proportion of
Other Race
Students
Student-Teacher
Ratio
Teacher Retention
Chronic Absence
Number of
Students (in
thousands)
Constant
District fixed
effects?
Number of
observations

Dependent: pass_eng
Coeff.
P>|z| Coeff.
(Std. Err.)
(Std.
Err.)
.1046*** 0.009
.0507
(.0402)
(.058)

P>|z|

0.382

Dependent: pass_math
Coeff.
P>|z| Coeff.
(Std. Err.)
(Std.
Err.)
.0891***
0.002 .1469***
(.0282)
(.0539)

P>|z|

0.006

-.0119
(.015)

0.428

.0179
(.0314)

0.569

.0175
(.0127)

0.169

-.0564**
(.0273)

0.039

.0141***
(.0013)
-. 0882*
(.0476)
.2371***
(.0730)

0.000

-

-

0.000

-

-

0.064

-

-

0.129

-

-

0.001

.0012
(.0040)

0.755

.0132***
(.0010)
-.0610
(.0402)
.1465***
(.0537)

0.006

.0041
(.0032)

0.193

-1.19***
(.2187)

0.000

-1.049
(2.983)

0.725

-1.654***
(.225)

0.000

-2.218
(2.577)

0.389

-1.14***
(.1328)
-.0065
(.2724)
-2.279**
(1.017)

0.000

.4785
(.8744)
2.238
(2.323)
-.9643
(2.653)

0.584

-1.089***
(.1366)
1.438***
(.3357)
-.8808
(.8555)

0.000

.9001
(1.40)
-2.292
(1.806)
-4.135
(2.766)

0.521

-.0182
(.0164)
.4869**
(.2382)
-2.94***
(.5306)
.0059**
(.00234)

0.268

.0252
(.0230)
.1677
(.2320)
-.4313
(.8592)
-.0972
(.0692)

0.272

-.0074
(.0132)
1.034***
(.2419)
-3.415***
(.4538)
.0103***
(.0023)

0.576

.0153
(.0181)
.5395**
(.2238)
-.9145*
(.5547)
-.0151
(.0538)

0.396

1.439***
(.4030)
NO

0.000

1.808***
(.6573)
YES

0.006

-.433
(.3571)
NO

0.225

.5228
(.5453)
YES

0.338

900

0.981
0.025

0.041
0.000
0.012

900

0.335
0.716

0.470
0.616
0.160

900
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0.000
0.303

0.000
0.000
0.000

900

0.204
0.135

0.016
0.099
0.779

Wald chi2
Prob>chi2
Pseudo R2

2238.64
0.00000
0.0675

52665.01
0.00000
0.0830

2627.11
0.00000
0.0736

74491.21
0.00000
0.0885

*=significant at α=0.10; **=significant at α=0.05; ***=significant at α=0.01
An extra $1,000 per-pupil in the school budget allocated fully to teacher expenditures increases
the log odds of passing the Mathematics MCAS exam by 0.1469 the following year, holding all
other variables constant. An extra $1,000 per-pupil in the school budget allocated fully to nonteacher expenditures decreases the log odds of passing the Mathematics MCAS exam by 0.0564
the following year, holding all other variables constant. Not adding any of the extra funds to
teachers’ salaries is expected to decrease the proportion of the students in the district who pass
the 10th grade Mathematics MCAS exam.
Comparing the estimations with and without the district fixed effects, one can clearly
see significant differences. For one, the coefficient on the lagged teacher expenditures per-pupil
is significant in the English MCAS exam estimation without district fixed effects and insignificant
in the estimation with them. The magnitude of the coefficient is also twice as large in the
estimation without district fixed effects than with them. From this information, the coefficient
on the lagged teacher expenditures per-pupil in the estimation without district fixed effects
faced upward bias due to the unobserved variables in the error term that are captured by
adding district dummy variables. Looking at the differences in the estimations using the
Mathematics MCAS exam, the coefficient on the lagged teacher expenditures per-pupil faced
downward bias from the unobserved variables in the error term. Adding the district fixed effects
almost doubled the size of the coefficient. As for the lagged non-teacher expenditure per-pupil
variable, the coefficient goes from being positive and insignificant with no district dummy
variables to negative and significant with district dummy variables. These changes from
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including district fixed effects show the dangers of unobserved but important variables in the
error term. Some of the omitted variable bias is alleviated by adding district fixed effects.
Why is the effect of teacher and non-teacher expenditures per-pupil significant on the
log odds of the passing rate on the Mathematics MCAS exam and not on the log odds of the
passing rate on the English MCAS exam? One reason could be that teacher expenditure does not
correlate as well with the proportion of students who pass the 10th grade English MCAS exam as
other variables. A student’s home life and parental involvement could have more correlation
than school expenditures. For instance, exposure to books and conversations with advanced
vocabulary help students improve their English skills and can occur naturally outside of school.
Math requires practice that may not be as natural outside of school. In this case, the school
administrators may be more willing to spend extra money on a good math. Also, when a school
does not put extra funds towards teachers’ salaries, the math teachers could feel less willing to
teach productively. Learning math could be more affected by the teacher and the teacher’s
characteristics than learning English. These are possible reasons why the effect of teacher
expenditures could be more correlated with the proportion who pass the Mathematics MCAS
exam than the English MCAS exam. More research could look into why school resources affect
scores in English and mathematics differently.
Another question posed from my analysis is why spending more on teachers would
improve student test scores. One possible connection between the two is improved teacher
quality. The higher pay may reflect an increase in the productivity of teachers or an increase in
the quality of the teachers. Because I include the student-teacher ratio and number of students
in the district, the number of teachers in the district must also be fixed when considering the

24

effects of changes in teacher expenditures per-pupil. Therefore, in the case of better teacher
quality, either the current teachers in the district may increase their quality or the district may
replace low-quality teachers with high-quality teachers when teacher salaries increase. Another
theory is the higher spending on teachers could be due to overtime work by teachers that is paid
for by the school district. Examples of overtime work could include spending extra time planning
lessons or tutoring after school hours. It may also be true that teachers affected by the pay jump
become more satisfied with their salaries. The increased pay satisfaction could lead to improved
school district-level academic performance (Currall et al., 2005). These examples increase a
teacher’s salary, improve the teacher’s quality, and help students learn more. The ideas posed
are theories, but future research could provide evidence that support or oppose these theories.
The models showed although increasing total in-district expenditures per-pupil may not
be significant in raising test scores, the allocation of extra funds matters, especially for math test
scores. The significance of teacher expenditures per-pupil and non-teacher expenditures perpupil for the passing rate on the 10th grade Mathematics MCAS exam is hidden when the effect
of expenditures is examined as a total. When extra funds are distributed efficiently, the passing
rate for the MCAS exams should be the highest possible holding other variables, like the teacher
retention rate or median household income, constant. Future studies could break down the
total expenditure variable even more to find how additional funds in each expenditure category
affects test scores in the district.
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Robustness Check for Fractional Logit Model
In the fractional logit model, the categories of test outcomes are passing or not passing,
with the not passing category a combination of needing improvement and failing the MCAS
exams. As a robustness check, I instead combined needing improvement with passing to create
new test outcome categories. The fractional logit model in this case estimates the effect of
school district expenditures on the log odds of proportions of 10th grade students in a district
not failing relative to failing the English and Mathematics MCAS exams. The purpose of the
robustness check is to see if the placement of the needs improvement category changes the
significance and/or the magnitude of the coefficients. If redefining the test outcomes
significantly changes the estimates from the original classification of the fractional logit model,
there is reason to follow-up by using the multinomial fractional model to consider three
categories of test scores rather than just two.
The results from the robustness check are found in Table 5.3 and 5.4. The most
noticeable difference between the fractional logit with a base of failing rather than not passing
is that the coefficient on lagged total in-district expenditure per-pupil is significant and negative
in the English MCAS exam estimation. That is, adding an extra $1,000 per-pupil to a school
district’s budget decreases the log odds of the proportion of students in the district not failing
relative to failing by 0.07 in the following year, holding all else equal. Adding money to the
budget increases the failing rate on the 10th grade English MCAS exam. One possible explanation
for this is that the money added to the district is used to help the students who are on the
border of passing the test but does not help those on the border of failing. Therefore, the
additional funds do not prevent the border students into falling into the failing zone. However,
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Table 5.3: Robustness Check of Fractional Logit Model with Total In-District Expenditures
as the Variable of Interest
Dependent: notfail_eng
Dependent: notfail_math
Coefficient
P>|z|
Coefficient
P>|z|
(Std. Err.)
(Std. Err.)
Lagged total in-district
-.0700**
0.022
-.0244
0.237
expenditure (in
(.0305)
(.0206)
thousands of dollars
per-pupil)
Lagged income (in
-.0071
0.104
.0016
0.506
thousands of dollars)
(.0044)
(.0024)
Proportion of African
-.2443
0.941
.3047
0.914
American Students
(3.300)
(2.816)
Proportion of Hispanic
-2.383*
0.094
-2.166**
0.038
Student
(1.421)
(1.042)
Proportion of Asian
4.041
0.105
3.548*
0.058
Students
(2.492)
(1.873)
Proportion of Other
-.5570
0.891
-2.438
0.344
Race Students
(4.082)
(2.576)
Student-Teacher Ratio
.0047
0.890
.0312
0.144
(.0345)
(.0213)
Teacher Retention
-.3704
0.319
.0071
0.984
(.3720)
(.3569)
Chronic Absence
-.1682
0.892
-1.044
0.233
(1.235)
(.8757)
Number of Students (in
-.1964***
0.008
-.1379**
0.017
thousands)
(.0738)
(.0577)
Constant
5.992***
0.000
2.924***
0.000
(.9331)
(.7011)
District fixed effects?
YES
YES
Number of observations
1,125
1,125
Wald chi2(234)
9835.21
12679.04
Prob > chi2
0.00000
0.00000
Pseudo R2
0.0572
0.0804
*=significant at α=0.10; **=significant at α=0.05; ***=significant at α=0.01
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from the previous estimation in Table 5.1, the coefficient on lagged total in-district expenditure
is insignificant in the English MCAS exam estimation. Continuing with my theory, this means that
the additional funds that may be devoted to pushing needs improvement students into the
passing area is not making a significant difference. Data on how funds affect each individual
student would provide more insight into this finding.
Another interesting difference comes from the estimation when total in-district
expenditure is broken into teacher and non-teacher expenditures in Table 5.4. In the estimation
with the Mathematics MCAS exam, the coefficient on the lagged teacher expenditure per-pupil
variable is no longer significant. It is also half the magnitude of the coefficient in the estimation
from Table 5.2. One reason could be that adding extra funds to teachers’ salaries raises students
who need improvement up to a passing score but does not have a big impact on raising failing
students up to higher scores. The coefficient on the lagged non-teacher expenditures per-pupil
in the Mathematics MCAS estimation is significant just like the estimation in Table 5.2. Holding
all else equal, an additional $1,000 per-pupil devoted solely to non-teacher expenditures will
lower the log odds of the proportion of students in a district who do not fail relative to the
proportion who fail by 0.095 in the next year. This means when extra money is not put into
teachers’ salaries, the proportion of students who fail the Mathematics MCAS exam increases.
This is the same finding as when the two test categories being compared were passing and not
passing, however, the magnitude of the coefficient is larger in the robustness check.
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Table 5.4: Robustness Check for Fractional Logit Model with Teacher and Non-Teacher
Expenditures as the Variables of Interest

Lagged teacher
expenditures (in
thousands per-pupil)
Lagged non-teacher
expenditures (in
thousands per-pupil)
Lagged income (in
thousands of dollars)
Proportion of
African-American
Students
Proportion of
Hispanic Students
Proportion of Asian
Students
Proportion of Other
Race Students
Student-Teacher
Ratio
Teacher Retention
Chronic Absence
Number of Students
(in thousands)
Constant
District fixed effects?

Dependent: notfail_eng
Coefficient (Std. P>|z|
Err.)
-.0493
0.602
(.0946)

Dependent: notfail_math
Coefficient
P>|z|
(Std. Err.)
.0864
0.105
(.0534)

-.0208
(.0544)

0.702

-.095***
(.0345)

0.006

-.0009
(.0066)
-4.707
(4.101)

0.882

.0087**
(.0037)
-.6231
(3.347)

0.018

-1.889
(1.538)
1.247
(3.371)
.5387
(4.397)
.0264
(.0394)
-.4581
(.3787)
.0503
(1.415)
-.1769**
(.0997)
4.753***
(1.081)
YES

0.220

-2.613**
(1.085)
.0535
(2.257)
-5.498*
(3.106)
.0273
(.0249)
.2675
(.3366)
-.6392
(1.009)
-.1363**
(.0664)
2.356***
(.7564)
YES

0.016

0.251

0.711
0.902
0.502
0.226
0.972
0.076
0.000

Number of
900
900
observations
Wald chi2(235)
41747.11
17705.65
Prob>chi2
0.00000
0.00000
2
Pseudo R
0.0609
0.0830
*=significant at α=0.10; **=significant at α=0.05; ***=significant at α=0.01
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0.852

0.981
0.077
0.272
0.427
0.527
0.040
0.002

From this test, I find the placement of the needs improvement category matters when
determining if school district expenditures affect test outcomes on the English and Mathematics
MCAS exam. This shows that separating the test outcomes into three categories rather than two
categories can provide more insight on the connection between expenditures and student
achievement.

Multinomial Fractional Logit Model
After finding estimates for the fractional logit model, I estimated the multinomial
fractional logit model. This model allows for multiple outcomes on the MCAS exam, rather than
passing and not passing or not failing and failing. The outcomes I consider are the proportion of
students who pass, need improvement, or fail the 10th grade English and Mathematics MCAS
exams. I use Maarten L. Buis’s Stata command fmlogit to fit the fractional multinomial logit
model, a multivariate generalization of the fractional logit model (Buis, 2017). Tables 5.5 and 5.6
show estimates from the multinomial fractional logit model using the one-year lagged teacher
and non-teacher expenditures per-pupil as the explanatory variables. The base category in these
estimations is the proportion of 10th grade students who need improvement on the English
MCAS exam and the proportion of 10th grade students who need improvement on the
Mathematics MCAS.
In Table 5.5, the coefficient on the one-year lag of teacher expenditures per-pupil is
insignificant in the estimation of the log odds of a district’s students passing versus needing
improvement on the 10th grade English test. The same coefficient is also insignificant in the
estimation of the log odds of a district’s students failing relative to needing improvement on
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Table 5.5: Multinomial Fractional Logit Model to Estimate the Effect of Teacher and
Non-Teacher Expenditures on Proportions of Student Performance on the English MCAS
Exam
pass_eng
fail_eng
Coefficient
P>|z|
Coefficient
P>|z|
(Std. Err.)
(Std. Err.)
Lagged teacher
.0991
0.125
.1416
0.174
expenditure (in
(.0646)
(.1042)
thousands per-pupil)
Lagged non-teacher
.0345
0.319
.0541
0.368
expenditure (in
(.0346)
(.0601)
thousands per-pupil)
Lagged income (in
.0025
0.604
.0034
0.669
thousands)
(.0049)
(.0081)
Proportion of African
.8551
0.799
5.531
0.224
American Students
(3.364)
(4.545)
Proportion of Hispanic
1.522
0.155
3.213*
0.088
Students
(1.069)
(1.882)
Proportion of Asian
3.163
0.318
1.865
0.688
Students
(3.170)
(4.645)
Proportion of Other
-1.405
0.673
-1.819
0.743
Race Students
(3.331)
(5.550)
Student-Teacher Ratio
.0232
0.354
-.0051
0.905
(.0251)
(.0430)
Teacher Retention
.4579*
0.098
.8807**
0.050
(.2763)
(.4490)
Chronic Absence
-.6542
0.519
-.660
0.694
(1.014)
(1.675)
Number of Students (in
-.0555
0.396
.1298
0.137
thousands)
(.0653)
(.0872)
Constant
1.360*
0.074
-3.249***
0.009
(.7621)
(1.252)
District fixed effects?
YES
Number of
900
observations
Wald chi2(470)
708546.78
Prob>chi2
0.00000
Base outcome: proportion of 10th grade students in a district who need improvement on
the English MCAS exam; *=significant at α=0.10; **=significant at α=0.05;
***=significant at α=0.01
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the English test. These results are consistent with the findings in Table 5.2 and Table 5.4.
Spending extra money on teacher salaries does not have a significant impact on improving (or
worsening) test scores on the 10th grade English MCAS exam.
Table 5.6 shows the one-year lag of teacher expenditures per-pupil is significant in
raising the proportion of passing students by decreasing the number of needs improvement
students on the 10th grade Mathematics exam. A $1,000 increase in teacher expenditures perpupil in the previous year results in a positive, statistically significant change of 0.1552 in the log
odds of proportion passing versus proportion needing improvement on the Mathematics MCAS
exam. The extra funds towards teachers also has no significant effect on the log odds of
proportion failing versus proportion needing improvement on the Mathematics MCAS exam.
This finding shows that the positive and significant coefficient on the lagged teacher expenditure
per-pupil variable in Table 5.2 for the Mathematics MCAS exam estimation is driven by the
needs improvement students being pushed up to passing scores. The lack of significance of the
coefficient in the log odds of a district’s students failing versus needing improvement estimation
is consistent with the finding in Table 5.4.
The coefficients on the lagged non-teacher expenditures per-pupil in Table 5.6 are also
consistent with previous results. Starting with the log odds of failing relative to needing
improvement on the Math exam, the coefficient is positive and significant. An additional $1,000
distributed solely to non-teacher expenditures will increase the log odds of a district’s students
failing versus needing improvement by 0.0725 in the next year, all else constant. The needs
improvement students who are on the border of failing might drop into the failing zone when
additional funds are not allocated toward teachers’ salaries. However, there is

32

Table 5.6: Multinomial Fractional Logit Model to Estimate the Effect of Teacher and
Non-Teacher Expenditures on Proportions of Student Performance on the Mathematics
MCAS Exam
pass_math
fail_math
Coefficient
P>|z|
Coefficient
P>|z|
(Std. Err.)
(Std. Err.)
Lagged teacher
.1552**
0.018
.0348
0.630
expenditure (in
(.0659)
(.0722)
thousands per-pupil)
Lagged non-teacher
-.0337
0.273
.0725*
0.056
expenditure (in
(.0307)
(.038)
thousands per-pupil)
Lagged income (in
.0019
0.613
-.0070
0.134
thousands)
(.0039)
(.004)
Proportion of African
-2.58
0.472
-1.296
0.793
American Students
(3.589)
(4.953)
Proportion of Hispanic
2.626
0.130
4.449618***
0.004
Students
(1.735)
(1.541903)
Proportion of Asian
-3.309
0.140
-2.780
0.335
Students
(2.241)
(2.885)
Proportion of Other
-3.030
0.376
3.289
0.412
Race Students
(3.425)
(4.014)
Student-Teacher Ratio
.0077
0.706
-.0204
0.457
(.0203)
(.0274)
Teacher Retention
.6089***
0.006
.2177
0.510
(.2204)
(.3304)
Chronic Absence
-.9874
0.110
-.1628
0.885
(.6177)
(1.128)
Number of Students (in
.0547
0.433
.177**
0.048
thousands)
(.0697)
(.0893)
Constant
.7423
0.233
-1.258
0.146
(.6224)
(.8652)
District fixed effects?
YES
Number of
900
observations
Wald chi2(470)
268733.85
Prob>chi2
0.00000
Base outcome: proportion of 10th grade students in a district who need improvement on
the Math MCAS exam; *=significant at α=0.10; **=significant at α=0.05; ***=significant
at α=0.01
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no significant effect of additional funds towards non-teacher expenditures on the log odds of a
district’s students passing versus needing improvement on the Mathematics MCAS exam.
The multinomial fractional models show consistency with the previous estimations in
Table 5.2 and 5.4 as well as add some support to my theory that the needs improvement
students who are on the border of either passing or failing the MCAS exam are the most
affected by school district expenditures. Individual student data is needed to test this
hypothesis. When considering how to allocate extra funds between teacher and non-teacher
expenditures, the estimation using the Mathematics MCAS exam suggests that putting that
money towards teachers will improve test scores. However, this is an extremely simplistic
approach. Throwing money at teachers without considering the functions of all other
expenditure categories separately is not a recommended policy. Categories like custodians, bus
drivers, building maintenance, and textbooks are necessary and should not be ignored. The ideal
option is to break down all expenditure categories to find how each contributes to test scores.
Aggregating expenditure categories hides the statistical significance of specific categories and
can be misleading. While throwing money at teachers is an ill-advised policy decision, it should
be recognized that increasing teacher salaries does have an affect on students’ test scores.
Looking into why this occurs will lead to a better understanding of the function of a teachers’
salary in student achievement and better policy regarding teachers’ salaries.
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6. CONCLUSION
From my research, I found the amount of money allocated to teachers matters for
improving student achievement. Although lagged total in-district expenditures per-pupil was
insignificant in my estimations of the fractional logit model, the category of lagged teacher
expenditures per-pupil was significant for the passing rate on the Mathematics MCAS exam. This
shows that looking at the aggregate of all categories of education expenditures does not show
enough information about the effects of money. The results of my estimations show no
evidence of an effect of total in-district expenditure per-pupil on the passing rate for the English
and Mathematics MCAS exams. However, there is a positive and significant effect of teacher
expenditures per-pupil on the passing rate of the 10th grade Mathematics MCAS exam.
Teachers’ salaries may be important because they reflect boosted productivity and create
incentive for high quality teachers to stay in the profession. But just looking at teacher versus
non-teacher expenditures is too simplistic. A suggestion to school district officials and future
researchers would be to discover how each expenditure category affects student achievement
to better allocate extra money in their budget.
A limitation of my research is the aggregated district data. It would be ideal to gather
data at the individual level to see the effects of increasing expenditures on individual student
test scores by tracking an individual over time. I could gain a better understanding of how
students on the border of failing or passing these MCAS exams, specifically the Mathematics
exam, are affected by additional money to specific expenditure categories. Also, individual data
would allow me to find the demographics of students who most benefit from increases in
specific expenditure categories. Another limitation is only including a lag for one year in my
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model. Ideally, I would account for the fact that students are influenced by the school
expenditures made from kindergarten through high school. One lag only allows for the effect of
expenditures made the previous year. Another potential problem with my model is the omitted
variable bias. I am unable to account for all relevant variables that affect student achievement.
For example, parental involvement in education, independent of household income, affects
both student test scores and expenditures and is not included in my models. Parents more
involved in their child’s education will be more willing to practice skills at home. This results in
better test scores. More involved parents also advocate for a larger school budget and more
local contribution to school expenditures. By adding district fixed effects to my model, I
alleviated some of the problems caused by omitted variable bias. However, there is still a
possibility that my coefficients are biased and unreliable. Other researchers have solved this
issue using regression discontinuity design or a value-added model.
Future research would involve addressing these limitations. I could use a regression
discontinuity design focused around districts where the school budget decided at the local level
barely passed or barely failed. Also, another addition to the research could be looking at other
measures of school achievement. For example, Jackson, Johnson, and Persico found that a 10%
increase in per-pupil spending every year for all twelve years of schooling leads to 7.25% higher
wages (Jackson, Johnson, and Persico, 2016). The long-term effects of increasing significant
categories of expenditures should yield interesting results. Also, with more time, I would like to
breakdown the total expenditures per-pupil into more groups. Specifically, I’d like to see how
money spent in classrooms (teacher salaries, books, computers, etc.) affects the proportion of
students who pass these exams.
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APPENDIX
Table A.1: Categories of Expenditures
Categories of Expenditures
Administration

Types of Expenditures in Each Category
school committee, superintendent, assistant
superintendents, business and finance, human
resources, legal services, information systems
curriculum directors, department heads, school
leadership, curriculum leaders, administration
technology, instructional coordinators
classroom teachers, specialist teachers (art, gym, etc.)

Instructional Leadership
Teachers
Other Teaching Services

medical/therapeutic services, substitute teachers,
paraprofessionals, librarians, media center directors
professional development leaders, professional days,
substitutes for professional development, professional
development costs
textbooks, instructional software or media,
instructional equipment, general classroom supplies,
classroom technology, library technologies, library
materials (books)
guidance/adjustment counselors, testing and
assessment, psychological services
attendance and parent liaisons, medical and health
services, transportation services, food services,
athletics, other student activities, school security
custodial services, heating of buildings, utility services,
maintenance of grounds, maintenance of buildings,
building security systems, maintenance of equipment,
extraordinary maintenance,
networking/telecommunications, technology
maintenance
employer retirement contributions, employee
separation costs, insurance for active employees,
insurance for retired employees, other non-employee
insurance, rental lease of equipment, rental lease of
buildings, short term interest RANSs, other fixed
charges, school crossing guards

Professional Development
Instructional
Materials/Equipment/Technology
Guidance, Counseling, Testing
Pupil Services
Operations and Maintenance

Benefits and Fixed Charges

42

Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics of Expenditures
Type of expenditure ($
per-pupil)
Administration
Instructional Leadership
Teachers
Other Teaching Services
Professional
Development
Instructional Materials
/Equipment/Technology
Guidance, Counseling,
Testing
Pupil Services
Operations and
Maintenance
Benefits and Fixed
Charges
Total In-district
Expenditures

Mean (standard
deviation)
$528.22
(193.81)
$930.50
(265.42)
$5,532.56
(892.97)
$1,129.70
(330.08)
$171.71
(124.07)
$362.36
(196.75)
$4567.60
(144.83)
$1,357.99
(364.05)
$1,120.86
(273.47)
$2,435.17
(726.50)
$14,020.03
(2531.29)
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Minimum

Maximum

$201.85

$3,332.07

$397.58

$2,321.85

$3747.96

$10,902.67

$386.88

$2,407.69

$10.65

$1,054.99

$32.46

$1,703.16

$113.88

$1,305.36

$301.90

$2,930.01

$485.71

$2,569.87

$899.02

$6,315.50

$9,351.93

$29,621.61

